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1 Introduction
Petty corruption is widespread in the developing world and affects primarily the lowest
levels of government, dealing directly with ordinary citizens and firms (e.g., tax collectors,
environmental, and labor inspectors).1 One of its most detrimental consequences is to
undermine the enforcement of regulations designed to protect society from risks and hazards
(e.g., pollution, accidents, etc.).
A major difficulty in the struggle against corruption is to provide low-ranking officials with
the incentives to adequately perform their duty. Two issues, particularly salient in developing
countries, give rise to this challenge. First, public officials are often given large discretionary
power: little transparency surrounds the decisions they make. Second, officials are rarely held
accountable for abusing their power (e.g., because the judicial system is weak, or because
supervisors are corrupt). As previous literature has emphasized, given such difficulties, even
perfectly benevolent governments may have no choice but to tolerate corruption (see, e.g.,
Tirole (1992), Hindriks et al. (1999), and Khalil et al. (2010)).
To overcome these limitations, several governments have recently introduced citizen
feedback schemes that gather assessments from ordinary citizens at the receiving end of public
services. Examples include Ghana’s Whistleblower Act and Punjab’s Citizen Feedback Model.2
Despite the potential of these initiatives, the literature on corruption has largely neglected the
question of how to optimally incorporate feedback in public officials’ incentive schemes. We
investigate this issue by developing a model of regulatory control in which officials benefit both
from high discretionary power and low levels of accountability. We characterize a mechanism
that, by tying officials’ pay to citizen feedback, deters corruption. Its main virtue, we argue,
1See Olken and Pande (2012) and Banerjee et al. (2012) for recent surveys.
2See Callen and Hasanain (2011) for a detailed description of the Punjab Model. Another example is the
anti-corruption website recently created in Kenya (www.president.go.ke/en/category/corruption.php), where
people can directly report cases of malfeasance. Less recent examples include hot-lines set up in countries such
as Uganda, where the government promised rewards for citizens reporting corrupt tax officials. In the same
vein, some NGOs have taken initiatives to facilitate reports of officials’ misconduct (e.g., the "I paid a bribe”
website in India). An obvious reason behind the growing interest in these schemes is that improvements in ICT
have dramatically reduced the cost of filing, registering, and processing feedback. See, e.g., The Economist
(September 24th, 2009).
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is simplicty: neither does it require the intervention of internal/external monitors and courts,
nor does the government need to verify the accuracy of the feedback received.
In our model, a population of entrepreneurs is required to comply with some regulation
(e.g., environmental law) upon undertaking an activity (e.g., the production of a good).
Compliance with regulation is privately costly, but avoids generating negative externalities
(e.g., pollution). Government officials are matched with entrepreneurs to perform a screening
function. They verify whether entrepreneurs comply with regulation, and either issue or deny
the permit necessary to carry out the activity. The government observes whether an official
grants a permit, but not the information upon which the decision is based. As a result, officials
can engage in (i) bribery, by obtaining money from noncompliant entrepreneurs in exchange
for granting the permit, and (ii) extortion, by forcing compliant entrepreneurs to pay a bribe
to be issued the permit.
To capture the fact that officials operate under low levels of accountability, we assume that
the expected sanctions they face are insufficient to deter corruption.3 Therefore, if it wishes to
deter bribery, the government has to pay bonuses to officials who deny permits. However, in the
absence of a feedback scheme, such a policy invites extortion: it makes systematically refusing
permits in the officials’ interest. The government cannot do better than offer low-powered
incentives, and tolerate bribery in order to deter extortion.4 Without exploiting feedback,
therefore, the enforcement of regulation is weak, because noncompliant entrepreneurs who
bribe their way to a permit generate potentially large negative externalities.
We then introduce citizen feedback and obtain a simple mechanism that allows to deter
both bribery and extortion. The main features of the mechanism are as follows. Entrepreneurs
are asked to file a complaint if they disagree with the official’s decision. Although the
government never overturns an official’s ruling, it promises a small reward to all entrepreneurs
3More precisely, in our model, limited liability protects officials; that is, the government cannot impose
negative wages. However, officials face a small expected penalty when misbehaving. The fact that expected
sanctions are limited captures the fact that, to convict corrupt officials, governments must follow legal
procedures that are often ineffective and costly, especially in developing countries.
4Several previous studies, including Hindriks et al. (1999) and Khalil et al. (2010), arrived to similar
conclusions.
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who file a complaint. In addition, officials receive a bonus when they deny permits without
triggering a complaint, and are paid a flat wage otherwise. Because feedback is solicited—and
rewarded, officials know that arbitrarily denying a permit leads to a complaint. Entrepreneurs
who comply with regulation can therefore obtain the permit without being victims of extortion.
Moreover, the government ensures that officials deny permits to noncompliant entrepreneurs
by setting the bonus at an appropriate level, by giving entrepreneurs the option to waive
their right to file a complaint, and by empowering officials with the means to compensate
noncompliant entrepreneurs who agree to waive this right.5
By deterring corruption, the feedback scheme we propose makes regulation more effective
in curbing negative externalities. Nevertheless, adopting this mechanism is not always socially
optimal. Because it entails the payment of bonuses to officials, the budget needed to maintain
the administration is expanded. As a result, we find, for the adoption of the feedback scheme
to be optimal, the cost of allocating the necessary resources must be relatively small compared
to the external costs society can avoid by taming corruption.
The "citizen feedback" programs recently developed in several countries, such as Punjab’s
Feedback Model, inspire the mechanism we propose. However, in such programs, feedback
is collected with the primary goals of guiding investigations against dishonest officials and
administering sanctions. We explore a different, and possibly complementary, use of feedback.
An important novelty of our proposal is to empower citizens with the ability to directly
influence the pay of the officials they interact with. By exploiting complaints, the government
is able to offer officials a high-powered incentive scheme that does not invite extortion. This
feature of our scheme is particularly relevant, given that the lack of transparency regarding
the officials’ decisions often hampers the implementation of effective anti-corruption incentives
(OECD (2013, p. 110)).6 An additional practical concern is that incentive systems may be
5The logic behind this incentive scheme is not unprecedented. For instance, several municipalities
in the UK outsource enforcement of parking meters to private companies. To limit abuses, incentive
contracts for enforcers stipulate bonuses tied to uncontested tickets. Furthermore, offenders who agree
to settle early (effectively waving their right to complain) are often entitled to discounts on fines
(http://www.economist.com/node/16847086/print, retrieved June 2015).
6Several scholars have argued in favor of linking officials’ rewards (either monetary or non-monetary) to
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ineffective if they provide broad discretion to higher-level supervisors (for instance, by requiring
them to assess complaints). However, one strength of our scheme is precisely that it is not
necessary to distinguish between fair and opportunistic complaints, so that the administrators
in charge of implementing it are left with little discretion to exercise. Finally, because of their
limited informational content, complaints can consist of very simple and inexpensive actions
(e.g., sending an SMS).
In the second part of the paper, along with other extensions, we introduce bureaucracy
intermediaries (e.g, paralegals, brokers, facilitators, etc.). Intermediaries specialize in assisting
individuals who must deal with administrations to obtain a government service (e.g., a permit),
and, according to evidence (Fredriksson (2014)), are common in developing countries. We
focus on their ability to facilitate bribery: by developing stable relationships with officials,
intermediaries guarantee a preferential treatment for their customers, thereby weakening the
incentives entrepreneurs have to comply with regulation. Our results suggest the pervasiveness
of intermediaries is a by-product of the low-powered incentives provided to officials. We also
show that, if properly exploited, the feedback scheme may allow the government to deter
officials from dealing with intermediaries, thereby strengthening the enforcement of regulation.
Related Literature. A vast literature exists on corruption in public administrations (see,
e.g., Aidt (2009), Banerjee et al. (2012), and Olken and Pande (2012) for surveys). A large
strand of this literature studies the optimal design of officials’ incentives in environments of
low accountability.7 A common finding is that a strong tension exists when trying to induce
officials to enforce rules and, at the same time, prevent them from abusing their discretionary
power (e.g., Hindriks et al. (1999), Polinsky and Shavell (2000), Khalil et al. (2010)). This
their performance in order to deter corruption (see, e.g., Polinsky and Shavell (2000)). Albeit limited, empirical
evidence on the effectiveness of this kind of measures suggests that they can be effective if carefully designed
(Olken and Pande (2012)). Kahn et al. (2001) studied an incentive program for tax collectors in Brazil, finding
evidence of reduction in the extent of bribery.
7This issue has been investigated in different settings, such as law enforcement (e.g., Polinsky and Shavell
(2000), Mishra and Mookherjee (2013), Burlando and Motta (2014)) and tax collection (e.g., Hindriks, et al.
(1999)).
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tension can be so strong that tolerating some forms of corruption in order to deter others is
often optimal. A contribution of our paper is to show how the government can deter both
forms of corruption if it exploits complaints from individuals dealing directly with officials.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper investigating such complaints is Atsu
Amegashie (forthcoming). However, in his model, citizens do not need to comply with rules
to be entitled to the government service.8
The literature on collusion in hierarchies has extensively investigated the consequences
of bribery and extortion on the design of incentives to supervisors. In a model of adverse
selection, Celik (2009) finds a supervisor is useful only if the principal provides the agent with
the possibility of blowing the whistle. Also in a model of adverse selection, Felli and Hortala-
Vallve (2014) show the principal can design a whistleblowing program to deter bribery, which,
unless it is carefuly designed, may pave the way to extortion. In environments of moral hazard,
Khalil et al. (2010) show that letting bribery occur in order to deter extortion is optimal, and
Vafai (2012) shows that deterring both forms of corruption is possible in case the supervisor’s
information is verifiable.
Finally, our paper relates to the growing literature on bureaucracy intermediaries. Bertrand
et al. (2007) empirically document their relevance in the context of driving examinations in
India. Drugov et al. (2014) examine how intermediaries affect the moral costs of corruption.
Theoretical studies include Hasker and Okten (2008), Bose and Gangopadhyay (2009),
Fredriksson (2014) and Dusha (2015). Our work departs from such studies by considering
citizen feedback.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 solves the game first assuming the government does not rely on entrepreneur feedback,
and then allowing for it. Section 4 presents the extensions, including that on bureaucracy
8Mookherjee and Png (1992) consider complaints in a model without bribery. Prendergast (2003) looks
at complaints as a means of bureaucratic oversight, but ignores corruption. Dufwenberg and Spagnolo (2015)
examine the proposal by Basu (2011) to "legalize bribe giving," and find granting amnesty to citizens who
self-report paying bribes is optimal.
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intermediaries. Section 5 concludes. Proofs of all Propositions and Lemmas are relegated to
the Appendix. Proofs of additional results and extensions can be found in the Supplmentary
Appendix.
2 The Setup
We consider a government and a continuum of pairs of entrepreneurs and government officials
of size equal to one. Entrepreneurs wish to engage in an activity (e.g., production of a good)
that generates a private benefit G. The activity is socially risky in that it imposes damages
D > G onto third-parties (e.g., pollution, health hazards) unless entrepreneurs comply with
some regulation (e.g., environmental law). The government requests that all entrepreneurs
comply with regulation, and hires officials to verify compliance. Upon verification, officials
decide whether to grant permits necessary to undertake the activity.9
Actions and Information. Each entrepreneur decides whether to apply for the permit.
We assume applying is costless, but require entrepreneurs to apply if and only if their
expected payoff is strictly higher than zero. Entrepreneurs intent on applying for the permit
unobservably choose whether to provide high (e = h) or low (e = l) effort, where exerting high
(low) effort means complying (not complying) with regulation. We assume that entrepreneurs
indifferent between complying or not choose to comply. An entrepreneur imposes an expected
damage D on third parties if she has chosen not to comply with regulation (i.e., e = l) and yet
is allowed to undertake the activity. In case damages occur, the government is unable to infer
which entrepreneur is liable.10 Choosing e = h implies a cost ψ to entrepreneurs, where ψ
is i.i.d. across entrepreneurs according to the cumulative distribution function H (·) with full
9We refer to citizens as entrepreneurs for concreteness, but our analysis is more general. It applies, for
instance, to the issuance of driver’s licenses. Because driving is risky and requires training, governments
typically require would-be drivers to undergo tests before being issued a license. There is abundant evidence
suggesting corruption significantly weakens the effectiveness of such tests (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2007). We
provide further examples in Section 5.
10For instance, establishing who is responsible for polluting a common resource (e.g., a river) is difficult
when several firms exploit it.
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support
[
0, ψ¯
]
. Entrepreneurs are thus heterogeneous in the cost of complying with regulation.
We assume ψ is private information to the entrepreneurs. We also assume G ≤ ψ¯ < D:
exerting high compliance effort is socially optimal, but not necessarily privately optimal.
Each entrepreneur (she) is randomly paired with an official (he). Within each pair,
the official and the entrepreneur observe a signal σ correlated with the latter’s effort level
e ∈ {l, h}.11 Specifically, σ can take two values: either σ = c (“compliance”) or σ = n (“non-
compliance”). We assume σ = c with probability 1 if the entrepreneur chose e = h, and with
probability 1 − ρ if instead e = l. Thus, σ = n with probability ρ ∈ (0, 1) when e = l.
In words, government officials fail to detect all noncompliant entrepreneurs, but compliant
entrepreneurs are never detected as noncompliant. This can capture a situation with limited
resources in which (i) officials are unable to scrutinize all applicants and (ii) those who are
not scrutinized are nevertheless eligible for the permit.12 In this vein, ρ can be interpreted
as the extent to which officials are time-constrained. We assume ρ is common knowledge and
constant across officials.
We assume σ is observable only to the given official-entrepreneur pair, and that having
it systematically verified by a third party (e.g., a court of law) is exceedingly costly. This is
especially realistic in delevoping countries for which inefficiencies of judicial-like procedures
are well-documented (see, e.g., Court et al. (2003)). The assumption that σ is observable to
the entrepreneur best fits situations in which little margin exists for interpretation regarding
compliance.13 This assumption also avoids unnecessary complications by ensuring bargaining
between officials and entrepreneurs takes place under symmetric information.
11To be precise, each pair’s σ depends only on the associated entrepreneur’s choice e. We do not introduce
pair-specific indexes on signals and actions to save on notation.
12Ruling out the possibility that compliant entrepreneurs are detected as noncompliant allows us to focus
squarely on the detrimental effects of corruption. However, our main results are robust to this modification,
as long as the likelihood of this type of mistake is not too large.
13An example is the regulation of truck weight (see Olken and Barron (2009)). A simple threshold exists,
known to both officials and drivers, above which a truck is considered overweight. If the driver is aware of the
amount of cargo on the truck, he is also aware that the official observes non-compliance as soon as the truck
is weighed. A further example is regulation requiring the installation of safety or anti-pollution equipment: it
is relatively simple to verify that equipment is installed, and, upon receiveing an inspection, it is reasonable
to expect the entrepreneur knows whether non-compliance has been uncovered.
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Within each pair, after having observed σ, the official rules whether to grant (r = g) or
deny (r = d) the permit to the entrepreneur. The permit certifies that the entrepreneur is
compliant. We assume entrepreneurs are able to undertake the activity only if they are in
possession of the permit, and normalize the private gain of an entrepreneur without a permit
to 0.14 Officials’ decisions regarding whether to grant or deny a permit are observable to the
government.
Absent corruption, it is socially optimal to request that permits be granted when σ = c
and denied when σ = n.15 However, officials are self-interested and can choose r ∈ {g, d}
independently of σ. In other words, they enjoy full discretionary power. Nevertheless, officials
face an expected sanction s when deceiving the government, which we posit happens when
either (i) r = d even though σ = c or (ii) r = g even though σ = n. This (exogenous) sanction
can have several interpretations: first, it may represent an expected penalty imposed by some
monitor (e.g., who verifies a subset of applications). Second, it can represent a moral cost of
dishonesty. Nonetheless, to capture the fact that officials operate in an environment of low
accountability, we assume this sanction is small; specifically, 0 ≤ s < G
2
. As we argue below,
when s ≥ G
2
, the government can deter all forms of corruption even in the absence of feedback
from entrepreneurs.
To increase the officials’ accountability, the government may run an "entrepreneur feedback
scheme” whereby entrepreneurs who were denied the permit indicate whether they agree
(f = 0) or disagree (f = 1) with their officials’ decision.16 For concreteness, we refer to
f = 1 as "filing a complaint." Entrepreneurs are able to costlessly file complaints regardless
14For instance, entrepreneurs could be unable to legally register their business without the permit. In
practice, though, entrepreneurs may be able to do business without permits (e.g., by operating in the informal
sector). Our main results are robust to this modification, as long as the private gain obtained without a permit
is (weakly) smaller than G, and as long as the expected harm imposed on society is not excessively larger than
D.
15Systematically denying permits would lead to no entrepreneur applying, and thus no economic activity.
Systematically granting the permit (i.e., not regulating the activity) would lead to no entrepreneur opting for
compliance, which is undesirable because D > G. The same applies when r = g (resp. r = d) when σ = n
(σ = c).
16Intuitively, disagreeing with the decision would never be optimal for an entrepreneur whose permit was
issued. Note that we restrict communication between entrepreneurs and the government to be binary in order
for the scheme to be as simple as possible.
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of their actual level of effort e and signal σ, and regardless of whether corruption occurred
(see below). For simplicity, we ignore private costs of filing complaints: t can be interpreted
as the reward net of such costs, with no change in the analysis. We assume the government is
unable (or does not attempt) to verify whether complaints are justified, and never overturns
an official’s decision following a complaint. Nevertheless, we show below that promising a
small transfer t to any entrepreneur who files a complaint may be socially optimal.
Contracts. The government does not observe an official’s signal σ, but observes his decision
as well as whether the entrepreneur he was paired with filed a complaint. The government is
thus able to tie each official’s wage to the decision r ∈ {g, d} he makes and to the feedback
f ∈ {0, 1} sent by the associated entrepreneur. Because all officials are identical and randomly
matched with entrepreneurs, they all receive the same schedule of wages. We assume limited
liability protects officials.17,18 Formally, officials are offered a schedule of non-negative wages
denoted {wg, wd,0, wd,1}, where an official receives wg ≥ 0 if he grants the permit (i.e., r = g),
wd,0 ≥ 0 in case he denies the permit (i.e., r = d) and the entrepreneur does not complain
(i.e., f = 0), and wd,1 ≥ 0 in case he denies the permit (i.e., r = d) and the entrepreneur files
a complaint (i.e., f = 1).
Payoffs. Let U (ψ, e, r, f, b) denote an entrepreneur’s ex post payoff, that is, following
the realization of σ (we do not make explicit the dependence on σ, because it affects the
entrepreneur’s payoff only indirectly). We assume U (ψ, e, r, f, b) is additively separable in the
gain G (if r = g), the cost of compliance ψ (if e = h), the bribe b paid to the official (if any),
and the reward t (if f = 1). For instance, U (ψ, h, g, 0, b) = G−b−ψ if an entrepreneur is issued
a permit after having paid a bribe despite a high level of effort, and U (ψ, h, d, 1, 0) = t− ψ if
an entrepreneur complains about the permit being denied despite having exerted high effort,
17This captures the fact that the government cannot impose penalties without evidence of wrongdoing (i.e.,
based only on whether permits are granted/denied and whether complaints are filed). As will become clear,
removing limited liabilty can only make feedback schemes more attractive.
18We ignore officials’ participation constraints for simplicity.
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and no bribe is paid.
Let V (σ, r, f, b) denote an official’s ex post payoff. We assume V (σ, r, f, b) is additively
separable in the wage w, the cost of lying s (if any), and the bribe b (if any). For instance,
V (n, g, 0, b) = wg−s+ b if an official collects a bribe b from the entrepreneur he is paired with
and (unduly) grants her a permit after having observed σ = n. Similarly, V (c, g, 0, b) = wg+b
if an official extorts a bribe in exchange for the permit, despite the entrepreneur being eligible.19
Finally, the government chooses {wg, wd,0, wd,1, t} to maximize the expected level of social
welfare, which is equal to the sum of all entrepreneur and officials’ expected payoffs, minus the
expected level of damages imposed on third-parties and the expected wage bill. Entrepreneurs,
officials, and third parties are given equal weight (set to 1). Moreover, we assume a cost λ ≥ 1
to society of making transfers to officials (the “cost of public funds”). Finally, the government
always has the option of banning the activity, in which case it systematically denies permits
and welfare is equal to zero.
Throughout, we assume G ≤ ψ¯ < D. In words, requesting that, upon undertaking the
activity, entrepreneurs comply with regulation is socially optimal. However, undertaking the
activity when requested to comply with regulation may not be socially (and privately) optimal.
Agreements Between Officials and Entrepreneurs. We assume officials have full
bargaining power when making deals with entrepreneurs. Formally, after having observed
σ, officials (possibly) make take-it-or-leave-it offers (“deals”) to the entrepreneur with whom
they are paired, where a deal specifies a bribe b and a pair of actions {r, f} to play. This
assumption is in line with our focus on circumstances in which ordinary citizens have little
protection vis-à-vis corrupt officials. Nevertheless, our main results do not depend on this
allocation of bargaining power. A more general treatment, in which we let the bargaining
outcome within each official-entrepreneur pair be determined by the Nash Bargaining solution
19Observe that we assume officials face the expected sanction s when choosing r inconsistently with σ, and
regardless of whether they take bribes. This captures a situation in which σ is more easily verifiable by third
parties than the payment of bribes. Assuming officials also face s whenever they take bribes leaves our results
qualitatively unchanged.
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concept, is presented in Section 4.3 below (and solved in the Supplementary Appendix).
If a deal is agreed upon, entrepreneurs and officials play as promised (they play
“cooperatively”). If the offer is rejected, no bribe is exchanged, and the game is played
noncooperatively. An entrepreneur thus accepts a deal if and only if the payoff it guarantees her
is higher than her payoff when playing non-cooperatively. We assume whether an entrepreneur-
official pair engages in corruption is unobservable to the government.
Formally, after observing σ, an official solves
max
{b,r,f}
V (σ, r, w, b) (1)
s.t. U (ψ, e, r, f, b) ≥ U ′σ,
where U ′σ ≡ U
(
ψ, e, r
′
σ, f
′
σ, 0
)
and where
{
r
′
σ, f
′
σ
}
denotes the pair of actions chosen by
the entrepreneur and the official when playing noncooperatively (so that, be definition, no
bribe is exchanged), for a given σ. Because bargaining occurs under symmetric information
about σ, and payoffs are linear in the bribe b, it is always optimal for an official to
design its offer such that the pair of actions {r, f} maximizes the pair’s collective payoff
V (σ, r, f, b) + U (ψ, e, r, f, b).
In the following, we distinguish between two types of corrupt behaviors: bribery and
extortion. Bribery occurs when an official obtains a payment from an entrepreneur found
not compliant (i.e., when σ = n) in return for granting the permit. Extortion occurs when
an official obtains a payment from an entrepreneur found compliant (i.e., when σ = c) in
return for granting the permit. As we explain below, these two types of corrupt behavior have
drastically different impacts on the entrepreneurs’ willingness to comply with regulation.
Observe that government officials can also abuse their discretionary power without
engaging in corruption. Specifically, to pocket as high a wage as possible, officials may be
tempted to make a decision r that contrasts with the signal realization they have observed.
That is, officials can choose r = d even though σ = c (we refer to such behavior as framing)
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or choose r = g even though σ = n.
Note that we do not restrict bribes to be positive: a priori, payments may also flow
from an official to an entrepreneur. Also, we do not impose any limit on the size of bribes,
except, of course, for the entrepreneurs’ willingness to pay for a permit. In Section 4.2, we
present an extended version of the model that explicitly incorporates budgetary constraints
for entrepreneurs.
Finally, we make the following additional assumptions to simplify the exposition. When an
official is indifferent between several deals, he choses the one the government prefers. Similarly,
when playing noncooperatively, and if indifferent between r = g and r = d, an official makes
the decision the government prefers (for instance, r = g if σ = c). These two assumptions are
unimportant because, as long as s > 0, the government can always (and almost costlessly)
break officials’ indifference and ensure a unique equilibrium. Regarding entrepreneurs, we
assume that, in case they are indifferent between accepting a deal or rejecting it, they accept
it. This is because an official can always break an entrepreneur’s indifference at an arbitrarily
small cost.
Timing. We summarize the model by presenting the timing of moves:
1. The government decides whether to allow the activity. If the activity is allowed, the
government chooses the officials’ wage schedule {wg, wd,0, wd,1} and the transfer t paid
to the entrepreneurs who file a complaint;
2. Entrepreneurs simultaneously decide whether to apply for the permit. If an entrepreneur
applies, she decides her effort level e ∈ {l, h} and is paired with an official.
3. For each entrepreneur-official pair, signal σ ∈ {c, n} is realized;
4. Each entrepreneur-official pair possibly makes a deal. Each official decides whether to
grant (r = g) or deny (r = d) the permit;
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5. For all pairs such that r = d, the entrepreneur decides whether to file a complaint
(f ∈ {0, 1});
6. The officials’ wages are paid, the entrepreneurs receive their private payoff, and damages
occur (if any).
3 Solving the Model
We first consider the benchmark case in which officials are uncorruptible. Next, we introduce
corruption, and characterize the officials’ optimal wage schedule in both the absence and
presence of an entrepreneur feedback scheme.
3.1 Uncorruptible Government Officials
Assume officials never make deals with entrepreneurs. To make sure officials choose (i) r = g
when σ = c and (ii) r = d when σ = n, the government can simply set all wages to zero,
namely, wg = wd = 0. Intuitively, conditioning wages on entrepreneur feedback is not useful.20
As a result, an entrepreneur intent on applying for the permit, and with cost of compliance
ψ, chooses to comply with regulation if and only if
G− ψ ≥ (1− ρ)G, (2)
which simplifies to ψ ≤ ρG. The gross benefit of complying is equal to ρG, that is, the net
increase in the probability that the official observes σ = c multiplied by the gain associated
with obtaining the permit.
Because max [G− ψ, (1− ρ)G] > 0 for ∀ψ, all entrepreneurs apply for the permit.
However, only a fraction H (ρG) chooses to comply. Therefore, if the activity is allowed,
20Suppose σ = c. An official’s payoff is equal to wg when choosing r = g, and equal to wd − s when r = d.
Similarly, when σ = n, an official’s payoff is equal to wd when choosing r = d, and equal to wg− s when r = g.
Thus, when wg = wd = 0, officials choose (i) r = g when σ = c and (ii) r = d when σ = n.
14
the expected level of social welfare—hereafter the “no-corruption” level of welfare—is equal to
WNC =
ˆ ρG
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ) + (1− ρ)
ˆ ψ
ρG
(G−D) dH (ψ) . (3)
Observe that, because officials’ verification technology is imperfect, they fail to deny the
permit to all noncompliant entrepreneurs. It follows that the expected level of damages is
positive and equal to (1− ρ) (1−H (ρG))D. As a consequence, social welfare is nonnegative
if and only if
D ≤ DNC0 ≡
G (1− ρ+ ρH (ρG))− ´ ρG
0
ψdH (ψ)
(1− ρ) (1−H (ρG)) .
When D > DNC0 , the government cannot do better than banning the activity.
3.2 Corruptible Government Officials
3.2.1 No Entrepreneur Feedback
Assume now officials are corruptible, but the government does not rely on entrepreneur
feedback to discipline them. Officials who grant the permit receive wg, and those who deny
receive wd. We show that deterring both bribery and extortion is impossible. As a result,
either tolerating bribery so as to deter extortion, or forbidding the activity is optimal.
To understand the tension that arises when trying to deter bribery and extortion, we discuss
both forms of corruption separately. Note that, because entrepreneur feedback is ruled out,
an entrepreneur and an official need only agree on a decision r and a bribe b when engaging
in corruption.
Bribery. Consider a given official whose signal indicates the entrepreneur he is paired with
has not complied with regulation (i.e., σ = n). Ignoring possible bribes, if the official denies
the permit (i.e., if r = d), his payoff is equal to wd and the entrepreneur’s is equal to 0.
By contrast, if the official unduly grants the permit (i.e., if r = g), his payoff is equal to
15
wg − s and the entrepreneur’s is equal to G. As a result, the official and the entrepreneur are
better off agreeing on r = g—that is, the surplus to shared among them is highest by playing
r = g—whenever
wg − s+G > wd.
Suppose this inequality holds. If, moreover, wg − s > wd, the entrepreneur and the official
agree on playing r = g without exchanging money: the entrepreneur would reject any request
for a bribe, anticipating that granting the permit is in the official’s best interest. By contrast,
if wg − s ≤ wd, the wage wd is high enough that, absent a bribe, denying the permit is in the
official’s interest. As a result, and because the official has full bargaining power, he is able to
extract a bribe equal to G (i.e., the entrepreneur’s willingness-to-pay for a permit).
Finally, if wd ≥ wg − s + G, there does not exist a bribe that the entrepreneur is willing
to pay and would lead to the official choosing r = g. Therefore, for the government to ensure
that permits are denied when σ = n, it must necessarily set
wd ≥ wg − s+G. (4)
Because G − s > 0, for the government to deter bribery, it must necessarily reward officials
who make decisions unfavorable to the entrepreneurs with whom they are paired. This finding
is common in the literature on corruption within organizations (see, e.g., Tirole (1992)).
Extortion or Framing. Consider now an official whose signal indicates the entrepreneur
should be granted the permit (i.e., σ = c). Ignoring possible bribes, if the official grants the
permit, his payoff is equal to wg and the entrepreneur’s is equal to G. By contrast, if the
official denies the permit, his payoff is equal to wd − s and the entrepreneur’s is equal to 0.
As a consequence, the official and the entrepreneur are better off choosing r = g whenever
wg +G ≥ wd− s. Suppose this inequality holds. If, moreover, wg ≥ wd− s, the official chooses
r = g without extracting a bribe. Indeed, the wage wg is high enough that granting the permit
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is in the official’s interest: the entrepreneur would reject any request for a bribe. By contrast,
if wd − s > wg, denying the permit is in the official’s own interest. As a result, and because
the official has full bargaining power, he is able to extort a bribe equal to G in return for the
permit. Thus, when wg +G ≥ wd− s, the official always chooses r = g when observing σ = c,
but does so without engaging in extortion only if wg ≥ wd − s.
Finally, if wd − s > wg + G, a feasible bribe does not exist—that is, one the entrepreneur
is willing to pay—that would lead to the official choosing r = g. The official then frames the
entrepreneur by choosing r = d.
Summing up, for the government to ensure that officials grant permits without engaging
in extortion, it must necessarily set
wg ≥ wd − s. (5)
Thus, to deter extortion, it is sufficient to set wg = wd; that is, it is sufficient to make the
officials’ wages unresponsive to their decisions. Indeed, when officials do not strictly gain from
framing entrepreneurs (or even lose, because of s), it is in their best interest to grant permits.
Rearranging (4) and (5) leads to the following chain of inequalities: s ≥ wd −wg ≥ G− s,
which cannot hold because G
2
> s by assumption.21 To prevent bribery, that is, to ensure r = d
when σ = n, the government has no choice but to reward officials who deny permits by setting
wd sufficiently high. However, doing so makes it in the officials’ interest to systematically deny
permits (that is, irrespective of σ), thereby paving the way to either extortion or framing.
Furthermore, because of the officials’ low accountability (i.e., the fact that expected sanctions
for abusing their power are low), the government is unable to deter all forms of corruption,
and has to choose between bribery and extortion.22
To establish which corrupt behavior should be deterred, let us briefly comment on the
21In the Supplementary Appendix, we show that the exact same two conditions are relevant (and cannot
jointly hold) when the outcome of the bargaining between entrepreneurs and officials is determined by the
Nash Bargaining solution concept.
22By contrast, in case G2 ≤ s, the government can deter both bribery and extortion by setting wages
appropriately.
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distinct consequences of having either (4) or (5) hold on the entrepreneurs’ incentives. Suppose
(4) holds. Officials deny permits when σ = n, but either frame or extort entrepreneurs when
σ = c. Because officials who engage in extortion are able to extract the entire value of
a permit, the entrepreneurs’ gross payoff is equal to zero both in case σ = c and σ = n.
Therefore, applying for the permit is of no value to the entrepreneurs, and welfare cannot be
positive.23
Suppose now (5) holds. Officials grant permits without extracting bribes when observing
σ = c. Thus, the gross payoff to an entrepreneur whose official has observed σ = c is equal to
G. By contrast, because (4) does not hold, officials grant permits in exchange for bribes equal
to G when σ = n. The gross payoff to an entrepreneur whose official has observed σ = n is
thus equal to zero. Anticipating officials’ behavior, a given entrepreneur intent on applying
complies with regulation if and only if
G− ψ ≥ (1− ρ)G, (6)
which simplifies to ψ ≤ ρG. Because max [G− ψ, (1− ρ)G] > 0 for ∀ψ, all entrepreneurs
apply for the permit, but only a fractionH(ρG) chooses to comply with regulation. Specifically,
those who comply do so because their private cost of compliance ψ is smaller than the expected
bribe ρG they would pay to obtain the permit if they chose e = l. For the remaining
entrepreneurs, ψ is large enough that it is rational not to comply, and run the risk of having
to pay the bribe if detected. Given that bribery is not deterred, all entrepreneurs who choose
not to comply with regulation obtain the permit.
The next proposition states the government’s optimal policy in the absence of an
entrepreneur feedback scheme. In what follows, letDNF0 ≡ G−
´ ρG
0 ψdH(ψ)
1−H(ρG) −ρs denote a threshold
on damages D.
23In the Supplementary Appendix, we show that extortion continues to have a more detrimental consequence
on welfare than bribery, unless entrepreneurs enjoy particularly high bargaining power. See Section 4.3 for a
brief discussion.
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Proposition 1. Suppose the government does not exploit entrepreneur feedback to discipline
officials. If D ≤ DNF0 , allowing the activity and tolerating bribery so as to prevent extortion
is socially optimal. The optimal officials’ wages are wg = 0 and wd ∈ [0, s], and the associated
level of social welfare is equal to
WNF =
ˆ ρG
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ) +
ˆ ψ¯
ρG
(G−D − ρs) dH (ψ) . (7)
If D > DNF0 , banning the activity is socially optimal.
If the government allows the activity, it must tolerate either bribery or extortion. However,
it is clear from the above discussion that tolerating extortion can never be a viable option. If
bribery is tolerated (so as to deter extortion), it is then sufficient to make the officials’ wages
unresponsive to their decisions (see (5)), and the government may as well set wd = wg = 0. It
follows that tolerating bribery minimizes the wage bill. Moreover, bribery has a disciplining
effect on entrepreneurs. Because those who are detected as noncompliant enjoy a lower payoff
than those who are not—and it is more likely that σ = c when e = h— many entrepreneurs
choose to comply with regulation, even if obtaining the permit with bribes is possible. The key
social cost of allowing bribery is therefore that entrepreneurs who choose not to comply—and
obtain the permit via bribery—impose damages D onto third-parties.
To further understand the consequences of corruption, comparing the achieved level of
welfare in (7) to the “no-corruption” one in (3) is instructive. Although, in both cases, (i)
the expected wage bill is zero and (ii) the number of compliant entrepreneurs is identical
(see (6)), welfare when bribery is tolerated is lower than in the “no-corruption” benchmark,
because, when bribery is tolerated, all noncompliant entrepreneurs obtain the permit. Without
corruption, officials effectively screen out entrepreneurs caught in breach of regulation.24 As a
direct consequence, corruption reduces the threshold on the level of damages D above which
the government prefers to ban the activity (i.e., DNF0 < DNC0 ).
24Recall that in the no-corruption benchmark, noncompliant entrepreneurs obtain the permit only if
undetected (i.e., with probability 1− ρ).
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In sum, we have found that in environments in which officials operate with high
discretionary power and low accountability, a welfare-maximizing government may have no
choice but to adopt low-powered incentives, thereby leaving the door open to bribery. This
result is not novel (see, e.g., Hindriks et al. (1999), and Khalil et al. (2010)). In line with
previous literature, it has been obtained assuming the government does not communicate with
the entrepreneurs. We explore this possibility in the next section.
3.2.2 Introducing Entrepreneur Feedback
Suppose now the government offers entrepreneurs the ability to file a complaint if they are
denied the permit. Specifically, although the government never overturns an official’s decision,
it commits to rewarding any entrepeneur who files a complaint with a transfer t > 0.25 In
addition, the government ties the officials’ pay to these possible complaints by offering a
schedule of wages {wg, wd,0, wd,1}.
We assume t is paid without the need for entrepeneurs to provide any evidence of
wrongdoing or of mistakes committed by the officials with whom they are paired, and officials
are never investigated following a complaint. Nonetheless, as we now argue, this mechanism
makes deterring both extortion and bribery possible.
To gain intuition, we revisit the incentives officials have to engage in corruption. Consider
extortion first, and recall that to deter it, the government must set wages so that granting
permits is in the officials’ interest when σ = c (otherwise, the threat of framing is credible).
Because t > 0, in the absence of a deal with her official, an entrepreneur who is denied the
permit systematically files a complaint (irrespective of σ). As a result, choosing r = g is in an
official’s interest when σ = c if and only if
wg ≥ wd,1 − s. (8)
25If we had made the assumption that an entrepreneur files a complaint when indifferent between filing or
not, we could have set t = 0 and achieved the same outcome. However, to stress the fact that, in practice, it
may be necessary to pay rewards to avoid multiple equlibria, we choose to set t > 0.
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Now consider bribery. When σ = n, and entrepreneurs file complaints when denied the
permit, officials choose r = d if and only if
wd,1 ≥ wg − s+G. (9)
As in the previous section, jointly satisfying (8) and (9) is impossible. However, it is not
necessary to make a choice between deterring extortion and deterring bribery. The government
can now exploit a third contingent wage (i.e., wd,0) to its benefit. In particular, suppose the
government sets t positive and arbitrarily close to zero, wd,0 = G − s, and wg = wd,1 = 0.
In words, the government rewards officials only when they deny permits without triggering
complaints. First, extortion is deterred because, when σ = c, it is in an official’s best interest
to grant the permit rather than deny it and trigger a complaint. That is, the threat of
framing is not credible: (8) is satisfied. Second, wd,0 is set large enough that, when σ = n, an
entrepreneur-official pair is collectively better off denying the permit and not filing a complaint.
Indeed, the associated surplus to be shared (i.e., wd,0) is weakly higher than (i) the surplus
when the official unduly grants the permit (i.e., G − s) and (ii) the surplus when the official
denies the permit and the entrepreneur files a complaint (i.e., t). Note that, for an agreement
in which r = d and f = 0 to be sustainable, an official needs to make a small transfer t to
the entrepreneur to persuade her not to file a complaint (formally, b = −t).26 Finally, observe
that wd,0 is not so large that an entrepreneur-official pair is better off denying the permit and
not filing a complaint when σ = c (i.e., wd,0 − s < G+ wg).
We summarize these findings in the following Lemma (the conditions under which this
mechanism is socially optimal are stated in Proposition 2).27
26If the entrepreneur were to refuse, the official would subsequently deny the permit (because wd,1 > wg−s),
and, in turn, the entrepreneur would file a complaint. However, the associated payoff to the entrepreneur would
be equal to t, which is weakly lower than the transfer promised by the official.
27The fact that wd,0 is equal to the value of the permit G, minus s, is a by-product of the assumption that
entrepreneurs face no budget constraints. We relax this assumption in the Supplementary Appendix (and
discuss it in Section 4.2). We show that, as the size of bribes is limited by budgetary constraints, so is the
level that wd,0 needs to attain in order to deter bribery. Our results are qualitatively unaffected.
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Lemma 1. The government can deter both bribery and extortion by implementing a feedback
scheme such that (i) a transfer t (arbitrarily close to 0) is promised to the entrepreneurs who
file a complaint and (ii) officials’ wages are wg = wd,1 = 0 < wd,0 = G− s.
Before commenting on the properties of the feedback scheme, we briefly discuss some
conditions necessary for its effective implementation. To avoid unnecessary modelling
complications, we assumed officials are able to give a small compensation to entrepreneurs who
renounce their right to complain. We also assumed entrepreneurs are able to credibly commit
not to file a complaint. In the model, both features are exploited by the government to deter
bribery. In practice, simple (and common) institutional measures can be adopted to ensure
the same outcome, without officials actually having to make payments and without relying
on entrepreneurs’ promises. To give a concrete example, suppose the government includes a
pre-filled complaint form together with each application file; to express dissatisfaction with
the official, unsuccessful applicants must return the form to, say, an office of complaints.
Applicants can credibly waive their right to file a complaint by returning the form to their
official instead. In addition, to enable officials to persuade entrepreneurs not to complain, the
government can grant them authority to make unsuccesful applicants eligible to, for instance,
a refund of application fees.28 We return in greater detail to the issue of implementation in
Section 3.2.3.
In the mechanism we propose, the ability to file a complaint is no more than a token that
allows entrepreneurs to obtain a limited compensation after being denied the permit. For the
government, the value of a complaint does not lie in its informational content, but rather in
how it affects the incentives of officials and entrepreneurs. Officials are aware that they will
face a complaint (and thus obtain no reward) if they deny the permit arbitrarily. On the
one hand, the ability to file a complaint puts compliant entrepreneurs in a position to rebuff
28Schemes whereby individuals explicitly waive rights in order to qualify for compensations are common
in reality. Consider, for instance, traffic law enforcement. In several countries (including France, Italy, and
the UK) drivers who are issued fines are entitled to discounts in case they immediately renounce their right
to appeal. The Supplementary Appendix contains two concrete and detailed examples of possible feedback
schemes.
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extortionary threats. On the other hand, it does not prevent officials from performing their
duty when paired with noncompliant entrepreneurs, because the government is able to instigate
a mutually beneficial outcome that involves the permit being denied. Thus, officials’ decisions
conform to what the government requires: in equilibrium, only entrepreneurs detected as
noncompliant are denied the permit, and no complaints are filed. In sum, by linking officials’
compensations to entrepreneur feedback, the government is able to introduce an effective high-
powered incentive scheme, despite the lack of transaprency that surrounds officials’ decisions.
A virtue of this mechanism is its simplicity, primarily because it does not rely on the
government being able to discern fair complaints from opportunistic ones. As a result,
complaints can consist of very simple (and inexpensive) actions for ordinary individuals,
such as sending text messages from mobile phones. Furthermore, the scheme imposes little
additional informational burden on the administration. In addition, because the mechanism
makes it rational for officials to be loyal because of the possibility of complaints, it minimizes
the need to rely on internal or external monitors (who may also be prone to corruption) to
discipline low-level public servants.
Welfare analysis. Having established that exploiting entrepreneur feedback makes
deterring both bribery and extortion feasible, we now turn to the question of whether adopting
such a scheme is socially optimal. The next proposition states the conditions under which
implementing the entrepreneur feedback scheme is socially optimal. Let DF ≡ λ (G− s) and
DF0 =
DNF0 −λρ(G−s)
1−ρ denote two thresholds on the damages D.
Proposition 2. Suppose the cost of public funds is such that 1 ≤ λ < DNF0
G−s , then:
1. When D ≤ DF , not exploiting entrepreneur feedback, and tolerating bribery so as to
prevent extortion by setting wg = wd = 0, is optimal .
2. When DF < D ≤ DF0 , introducing an entrepreneur feedback scheme that (i) promises a
transfer t (arbitrarily close to 0) to entrepreneurs who file a complaint and (ii) specifies
wages wg = wd,1 = 0 < wd,0 = G− s is optimal.
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3. When D > DF0 , banning the activity is optimal.
When λ ≥ DNF0
G−s , not exploiting entrepreneur feedback, and tolerating bribery so as to prevent
extortion by setting wg = wd = 0, is optimal if and only if D < DNF0 . Otherwise, banning the
activity is optimal.
To gain intuition, a review of the advantages and drawbacks of the entrepreneur feedback
scheme is useful. To begin with, the scheme allows the government not only to deter extortion,
but also to deter bribery. As a result, no entrepreneur found ineligible obtains the permit.
Also, by setting t very small, the government makes incentives to comply with regulation
virtually as strong as in the no-corruption benchmark, because an entrepreneur’s payoff is
equal to G when σ = c and equal to t when σ = n.29 Thus, the expected level of gains and
damages the activity generates is identical to that when corruption is unfeasible. Finally, the
only drawback is that the government must promise officials a positive wage wd,0 for denying
permits. Because it is paid in equilibrium, this bonus increases the government’s wage bill.
When the entrepreneur feedback scheme is implemented, social welfare is equal to
WF =
ˆ ρG
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ) + (1− ρ)
ˆ ψ¯
ρG
(G−D) dH (ψ)− (1−H (ρG)) ρ (λ− 1) (G− s) . (10)
Because of the positive wage bill, the cost of public funds λ cannot be excessively high
for the entrepreneur feedback scheme to be optimal. We find that, if λ ≤ DNF0
G−s , the feedback
scheme dominates the "low-powered" scheme that tolerates bribery stated in Proposition 1—
the best alternative for the government, provided it wishes to allow the activity—as long as
the damages D are large enough but not excessively so (i.e., DF < D ≤ DF0 ).30 Intuitively,
paying high wages in order to deter bribery is worthwile for the government only if the
29An entrepreneur with cost ψ intent on applying chooses e = h if and only if G−ψ ≥ ρt+(1− ρ)G. Because
max [G− ψ, ρt+ (1− ρ)G] > 0, all entrepreneurs apply. Therefore, the share of compliant entrepreneurs is
arbitrarily close to H (ρG); that is, arbitrarily close to that of the "no-corruption" benchmark.
30To show that D
NF
0
G−s > 1, observe that the inequality G − s <
G−´ ρG
0
ψdH(ψ)
1−H(ρG) − ρs simplifies to
(G− (1− ρ) s) (1−H (ρG)) < G− ´ ρG
0
ψdH (ψ). This last inequality holds because
´ ρG
0
ψdH (ψ) < GH (ρG)
implies G− ´ ρG
0
ψdH (ψ) > G (1−H (ρG)).
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Figure 1: Illustration of the optimal policy as a function D and λ.
damages it avoids are large enough. Nevertheless, because the officials’ verification technology
is imperfect, denying permits to all noncompliant entrepreneurs is not possible even in the
presence of the feedback scheme. As a result, the government cannot do better than to ban
the activity when damages are very high (i.e., D > DF0 ). Finally, if λ is high (i.e., λ >
DNF0
G−s ),
exploiting entrepreneur feedback is never optimal. The severity of the damages required for
the feedback scheme to dominate the low-powered scheme is so high that social welfare would
be negative if the activity was allowed. The government then adopts the same policy as in
Proposition 1, that is, tolerate bribery so as to deter extortion when D < DNF0 , and otherwise
ban the activity. For illustrative purposes, we provide a graphical representation of the regions
where each policy is optimal in Figure 1.
3.2.3 Implementing the Feedback Scheme
We now discuss the main conditions for the effective implementation of the feedback scheme
outlined above. In line with the preceding analysis, the discussion assumes deterring corruption
is the government’s objective.
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Our model assumes the government is able to gather feedback and distribute the rewards
promised to individuals filing complaints. A separate agency, created for this purpose, may
perform this function. A natural concern arises that the scheme’s administrators might also be
corrupt (see, e.g., Mishra (2006)). However, the properties of the system we propose suggest
this issue should not be too strong. First, the administrators do not need to interact in
person with citizens or other agencies’ administrators (feedback can be gathered through, for
instance, a hotline, an sms service, or an internet website), thereby reducing opportunities
for collusion. In addition, our scheme is such that verifying the accuracy of complaints (e.g.,
through hearings, internal investigations, etc.) is unnecessary, so that the administrators are
left with little discretion to exercise.
In our analysis, the government is also able to tie officials’ pay to the decisions they
make, and to possible complaints. As the Punjab Feedback Model suggests, governments
can keep track of officials’ decisions and feedback from citizens, conceivably with the aid of
basic communication technologies (Callen and Hasanain (2011)). A common way of achieving
this is to request (i) that all applicants be issued a unique identification number (e.g., via
a government website) and (ii) that officials enter individuals’ identification numbers in the
system before reviewing their case.31
Our mechanism relies on the ability of officials who deny permits to convince ineligible
applicants not to file complaints. Indeed, because the government promises rewards to all
unsuccessful applicants filing a complaint, the latter have incentives to complain even when
their official’s decision was fair. In our formal model, officials convince entrepreneurs not to
file a complaint by making a small monetary transfer. In practice, transparent institutional
measures can be taken to empower officials with the ability to raise the payoff of unsuccessful
candidates. Suppose, as is common, that applicants are required to pay an application fee to
have their case reviewed.32 Suppose also that the government creates a procedure through
31As a side note, making the obtention of identification numbers slightly costly (or time consuming) can
also prevent individuals from abusing the scheme and initiate bogus applications only to file complaints and
pocket rewards.
32Application fees can be incorporated in our model without affecting the main results. We consider them
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which applicants can waive their right to file a complaint. Government officials can be granted
discretion to make unsuccessful candidates eligible for a small refund in case they activate the
waiver. Alternatively, unsuccesful applicants wishing to apply again could become eligible to
have the process expedited, be exempt from future application fees, and so on.
Further, we solved our model assuming entrepreneurs and officials could reach binding
agreements. We found it was in the government’s interest to foster welfare-enhancing
cooperation between ineligible entrepreneurs and officials. To ensure the same outcome when
agreements must be self-sustainable (and at the same time deter extortion), the government
should ensure an applicant’s decision to waive her right to complain (i) permanently and
automatically eliminates her ability to file a complaint,33 (ii) be observable to the officials,
and (iii) be made before the decision regarding the issuance of the permit. Applicants are
then given a credible and observable commitment device not to file a complaint. Moreover,
because, to be valid, the waiver must be activated before the officials’ final decision, it is
enough for eligible applicants to not exercise the waiver—a decision observed by officials—to
make it subsequently rational for the officials (who found no evidence of non-compliance) to
issue the permit; that is, extortion is deterred.34
Finally, as for all policy innovations at the grassroots level, significant care should be
devoted to informing citizens of the features of the scheme. For instance, a necessary condition
for the scheme to be effective is that applicants are aware of officials’ incentives in case
they rebuff extortionary threats. Informing them of the consequences of filing a complaint
is therefore important.
For the sake of concreteness, we present in the Supplementary Appendix two detailed
in an extension (see Section 4.2).
33Applicants could otherwise choose to benefit both from the compensation made when exercising the waiver
and that when filing a complaint. Officials would anticipate this event, their incentives to deny permits would
be weakened, and bribery would no longer be deterred.
34Naturally, applicants alone should decide whether to activate the waiver. Officials would otherwise have
incentives to systematically impose waivers, and extortion would no longer be deterred. The examples we
provide in the Supplementary Appendix suggest this is easily avoidable. For instance, applicants may be
assigned a code (unknown to the official) at the start of the application process. Entering the code would be
necessary to file a complaint. To credibly waive the right to complain, the applicant can reveal the code to
the official (who can then enter it in the system, thereby making any complaint void).
27
examples of possible feedback schemes that conform to the conditions discussed above.
4 Extensions
4.1 Bureaucracy Intermediaries
We have so far assumed the interaction between officials and entrepreneurs takes place
directly. We now extend the model to consider indirect interaction through intermediaries
(e.g., paralegals, brokers, facilitators, etc.). This extension is of natural interest because, as
previous literature has emphasized, intermediaries are quite common in developing countries
(see, for instance, Bertrand et al. (2007) and Fredriksson (2014)).
Anecdotal evidence suggests intermediaries perform several functions. On the one hand,
they reduce the transaction costs of dealing with the administration. Intermediaries generally
possess a superior technology for handling paperwork. On the other hand, intermediaries
also facilitate corruption: by developing stable relationships with officials, they guarantee a
preferential treatment for their customers. Fully capturing the role of intermediaries in a
single model is difficult, and the objective of this section is therefore limited in scope. Because
our primary interest is in the interplay between corruption and intermediaries, we ignore the
cost-saving aspect of the services they provide.
We show that the pervasiveness of intermediaries is a by-product of providing low-powered
incentives to officials. When entrepreneur feedback is ruled out, the optimal incentive scheme is
such that officials collect bribes from noncompliant entrepreneurs by means of intermediaries.
Therefore, much like direct bribery, intermediaries are a “necessary evil.” Next, we show that,
if exploited appropriately, the entrepreneur feedback scheme can reduce the pervasiveness of
intermediaries, thereby improving the effectiveness of the regulatory system.
Modified setup. The action space of entrepreneurs is expanded to allow them to acquire
the permit via an intermediary, instead of interacting directly with an official. Specifically,
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e = {h, l, i}, where i denotes “using an intermediary.” An intermediary guarantees a permit by
means of his connection with the official. Hence, if e = i, the official always chooses r = g. It
follows that obtaining the permit via the intermediary does not require any compliance effort
on the entrepreneur’s part. However, a fee ϕ has to be paid for the intermediary’s service. In
turn, the intermediary pays a price p to the official issuing the permit. In other words, the
official simply sells the permit to the intermediary, who then re-sells it to the entrepreneur.
When an entrepreneur is indifferent between e = i and e = l, we suppose she chooses e = i.
For simplicity, we also assume intermediaries sustain no costs (except for the money paid to
the official) and make no profits (e.g., because of free entry); relaxing these assumptions would
slightly complicate the analysis without altering the results.
One of the main reasons intermediaries enjoy preferential access to officials is that they
develop long-term relationships. Such relationships require mutual trust and commitment to
not renege on agreements. Accordingly, we assume each official can commit to the price p
before entrepreneurs choose e. By contrast, officials cannot commit in advance to the bribes
they would request when interacting with entrepreneurs directly—the relationship between
officials and entrepreneurs being “one shot”. Hence, if e = {h, l} are chosen, the continuation
game is exactly as in our basic setup. We assume that if an entrepreneur has chosen to deal
with the official directly, she cannot revise her decision (and switch to an intermediary) at a
later stage.
As in the baseline model, we assume e is unobservable to the government. Specifically,
whether a permit has been issued by means of an intermediary cannot be detected. Each
official deals with an exogenous set of intermediaries. To facilitate comparison with previous
results, we retain the assumption that entrepreneurs are matched exogenously with officials
and, consequently, with (one of) the intermediaries with whom the official regularly deals. We
therefore abstract from competition among officials.
Similarly to our baseline model, the feedback scheme we propose involves paying a bonus to
officials who deny permits. As we show below, in the presence of intermediaries, officials may
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be tempted to abuse the scheme in case these bonuses are very large: they can systematically
deny permits to compliant entrepreneurs, and compensate them with bribes greater than the
value of a permit. To capture the fact that, in practice, it may be difficult for officials to pay
large “bribes” without being detected, we assume there is a transaction cost equal to z − 1,
with z ≥ 1, for every dollar that officials transfer to entrepreneurs.35 Formally, we assume
that when making a deal with entrepreneurs such that b < 0, the official sustains a total cost
equal to zb. Of course, transaction costs could also affect the bribes that entrepreneurs pay to
officials. However, introducing such costs can only strengthen our results (by making bribery
less profitable, transaction costs would decrease the government’s wage bill when implementing
the feedback scheme).
Finally, we make some assumptions to streamline exposition. We assume ψ ∼ U [0, ψ¯].
Hence, H(ψ) = ψ
ψ¯
. Also, we assume D is never so large that the government cannot do better
than banning the productive activity.
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The government chooses the officials’ wage schedule {wg, wd,1, wd,0} and, when
applicable, the transfer t to the entrepreneurs who file complaints;
2. Each official sets p, and intermediaries set ϕ;
3. Each entrepreneur is paired with an official and an intermediary, and chooses e = {h, l, i};
4. All entrepreneurs who chose e = i pay ϕ = p to the intermediary. The latter transfers
p to the official, who grants the permit regardless of σ. For all other entrepreneurs, the
game proceeds as in the baseline model.
35This formulation of transaction costs is widely used in the literature on corruption. See, e.g., Tirole (1992).
Note also that the incentive scheme in Section 3.2.2 is never subject to this kind of abuses. Introducing this
transaction cost whould thus have vitually no implication on the analysis.
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Entrepreneurs’ incentives. Consider the problem faced by an entrepreneur with cost of
compliance ψ. If she chooses e = {h, l}, she obtains the same payoffs as in Section 3. If
instead e = i, her payoff is G − p. Let ψ˜ denote the cost of the entrepreneur indifferent
between complying and not complying with regulation; that is, let ψ˜ be defined as
U
(
ψ˜, h
)
= max [U (l) , U(i)] . (11)
To save on notation, we drop the arguments other than e in the function U(·). A quantity
H(ψ˜) of entrepreneurs chooses e = h, and the remainder choose either e = l or e = i. To
simplify exposition, we assume all entrepreneurs apply for the permit.36
Officials’ incentives. For notational convenience, we write V (σ) as shorthand for
V (σ, r, w, b). Assume an entrepreneur chooses to deal directly with the official with whom
she is paired, i.e., e = {h, l}. The official’s interim payoff (i.e., before the realization of σ)
is then V (c) if the entrepreneur chooses e = h, and ρV (n) + (1− ρ)V (c) if the entrepreneur
chooses e = l.
Assume now the entrepreneur chooses e = i. The official with whom she is paired pockets
the bribe p from the intermediary, the salary wg, and incurs the cost s with probability ρ (i.e.,
the probability that σ = n). Hence, the official’s payoff is wg + p− ρs.
When choosing p, an official maximizes his ex ante expected payoff, that is, his expected
payoff computed using H(ψ). Assume noncompliant entrepreneurs use intermediaries, i.e.,
U(i) ≥ U (l). Then, the official’s ex ante payoff is
H(ψ˜) · (V (c)) +
(
1−H(ψ˜)
)
· (wg + p− ρs)
36This is without loss of generality. As in the baseline model, it is never optimal to tolerate extortion. As a
result, the expected payoff of an entrepreneur who does not comply with regulation but applies for the permit
(without going through an intermediary) is strictly positive (because σ = c with probabiliy 1− ρ when e 6= h).
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= H(ψ˜) · (wrc + bc − l(c, r)s) +
(
1−H(ψ˜)
)
· (wg + p− ρs) .
In the expression, wrc and bc denote, respectively, the wage and the (direct) bribe the official
collects when σ = c. As before, l(c, r) is an indicator function taking a value of 1 if r = d, and
0 otherwise. To interpret this expression, observe that H(ψ˜) is the ex ante probability of facing
an entrepreneur that chose to comply with regulation. By contrast, with probability 1−H(ψ˜),
the entrepreneur chooses e = i, which results in an expected payoff equal to wg + p− ρs. Note
that, by assumption, p does not affect the size of the pool of potential applicants for an official,
but only their compliance effort e.
Assume now U(i) < U (l). The official’s ex ante payoff is then equal to
H(ψ˜) · (V (c)) +
(
1−H(ψ˜)
)
· (ρV (n) + (1− ρ)V (c)) =
H(ψ˜)·(wrc + bc − l(c, r)s)+
(
1−H(ψ˜)
)
·(ρ (wrn + bn − l(n, r)s) + (1− ρ) (wrc + bc − l(c, r)s)) .
In the expression, wrn and bn denote, respectively, the wage and the bribe when σ = n, and
l(n, r) is an indicator function taking a value of 1 if r = g, and 0 otherwise. With probability
H(ψ˜) (resp. 1−H(ψ˜) ), the official is paired with an entrepreneur who chooses e = h (e = l).
No entrepreneur feedback. We begin from the benchmark case in which the government
does not make use of entrepreneur feedback; that is, wd,0 = wd,1 = wd and t = 0. Consider
the direct interaction between an official and an entrepreneur. The game played by the two
parties is identical to that in the baseline model. Hence, (4) has to hold in order to deter
bribery, whereas (5) has to hold to deter extortion (see Section 3.2). As previously shown, the
two conditions cannot hold jointly, and the optimal incentive scheme has to be such that (5)
holds.37 Therefore, we have bc = 0, bn = G, and r = g for ∀σ. In words, permits are always
37We provide an informal argument. Suppose the government did not deter extortion. Any entrepreneur
complying with regulation would, with probability 1, have to pay a bribe b = G to obtain the permit. Hence,
the payoff to an entrepreneur choosing e = h would be nonpositive, implying that no entrepreneur would
32
granted, but a bribe equal to G is paid when non-compliance is detected.
The following Proposition (proved in the Appendix) describes the outcome in the absence
of a feedback scheme:
Proposition 3. Suppose the government does not rely on entrepreneur feedback to discipline
officials.
• The optimal incentive scheme is such that wg = 0 and wd ∈ [0, s]. Officials set
p = min
[
ψ¯+ρs
2
, ρG
]
. A share of entrepreneurs equal to min
[
H (ρG) , H
(
ψ¯+ρs
2
)]
complies
with regulation. The remainder obtain the permit via an intermediary.
• If G > ψ¯+ρs
2ρ
, the share of noncompliant entrepreneurs is strictly larger than in the
baseline model (where intermediaries are ruled out). Otherwise, it is identical.
In the absence of a feedback scheme, providing officials with low-powered incentives—
thereby leaving the door open to bribery—is optimal. Moreover, officials collect bribes from
intermediaries rather than directly from noncompliant entrepreneurs. The intuition is as
follows. Consider an entrepreneur who is unwilling to comply with regulation. The cost of
acquiring the permit via an intermediary is p, and equal to the expected bribe ρG if dealing
with the official directly (i.e., the probability ρ that non-compliance is uncovered times the
bribe G). Suppose p = ρG. Because the expected share of noncompliant entrepreneurs (i.e.,
those for which ψ < p) is 1 − H(ρG), and because the official collects ρG from each, he
obtains an expected payoff equal to that he would have enjoyed had he decided not to deal
with intermediaries.38 Nevertheless, when the expected bribe ρG is large enough, the official
finds it profitable to reduce p. By so doing, he reduces the expected revenue collected from
inframarginal noncompliant entrepreneurs (who would have chosen e = i even at p = ρG),
but the higher probability of facing a noncompliant entrepreneur more than compensates the
choose to comply with regulation. Clearly, this outcome cannot be socially desirable.
38If an official sets p > ρG, all associated entrepreneurs who do not comply with regulation avoid
intermediaries, i.e., they choose e = l. However, the official’s expected payoff would be the same as when
p = ρG. Hence, this strategy is weakly dominated.
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reduction. However, in a one-shot interaction with an entrepreneur, the official cannot commit
to an expected bribe lower than ρG, even if reducing it to attract more “customers” (i.e., more
entrepreneurs choosing not to comply with regulation) could be desirable. By contrast, the
official can commit to p before entrepreneurs choose e. As a result, the expected cost of
obtaining a permit without compliance can be credibly set below ρG.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 3 is that intermediaries make non-compliance
more pervasive when G > ψ¯+ρs
2ρ
(and do not affect it otherwise). Under this condition, the role
of intermediaries reduces social welfare.
Corollary. Suppose the government does not rely on entrepreneur feedback to discipline
officials. Banning intermediaries would be socially desirable if and only if G > ψ¯+ρs
2ρ
.
Of course, even a welfare-maximizing government could have difficulties cracking down on
intermediaries, given that many operate in the informal sector. The government may therefore
have to devise a strategy to provide officials with the right incentives to reject indirect bribes.
However, just like in our baseline model, the threat of extortion makes it impossible, and there
is no better option than designing low-powered incentives.
Entrepreneur Feedback. We now let the government exploit entrepreneur feedback. We
restrict attention to the case in which G > ψ¯+ρs
2ρ
, because we are interested in situations
in which, in the absence of feedback, social welfare would improve if intermediaries were
unavailable (see above). Furthermore, we do not characterize the optimal incentive scheme.
Rather, we establish the existence of a scheme that (i) makes it possible to deter both extortion
and bribery (direct as well indirect), and (ii) increases social welfare. This partial approach
is sufficient to establish that exploiting entrepreneur feedback is useful also in presence of
intermediaries. The mechanism we characterize is close in spirit to that of Proposition 2, and
is such that officials are rewarded only when they deny permits without triggering complaints,
i.e., wd,0 ≥ G− s > wd,1 = wg = 0.
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In the following, let G¯ ≡
ψ¯− ρs
z
+
√
(ψ¯−ρs/z)2− 1z
(
(ψ¯−ρs)2−4ρsψ¯
)
2ρ
denote a threshold on G and let
w¯ ≡ (ψ¯−ρs)
2
4ρ(ψ¯−ρG) denote a threshold on wd,0.
Proposition 4. Assume deterring bribery is socially optimal, but not possible without
exploiting entrepreneur feedback.
Provided G ≤ G¯, by exploiting feedback and setting wd,0 = w¯ > wd,1 = wg = 0, the
government can deter all forms of corruption, including indirect bribery. Also, a threshold
DI exists such that, when D > DI , social welfare is strictly higher when this scheme is
implemented than when entrepreneur feedback is not exploited.
If G > G¯, the feedback scheme fails to deter all forms of corruption.
The logic underpinning this scheme is identical to the baseline model. To fully deter
bribery, however, the government also needs to make sure officials do not find it profitable to
sell permits through intermediaries. This can be achieved by raising wd,0 up to w¯ (observe that
the optimal wd,0 in absence of intermediaries, as stated in Proposition 2, is equal to G − s,
which is smaller than w¯). Intuitively, when the expected gain from catching noncompliant
entrepreneurs is large enough, officials are better off not dealing with intermediaries (formally,
they set p so high that using intermediaries is prohibitively expensive for entrepreneurs).
Proposition 4 states that entrepreneur feedback may help tackle intermediated
corruption.39 However, when it is feasible, the scheme is more expensive than if intermediaries
were absent. This is not surprising: in our model, intermediaries allow officials to commit to
bribes which would be unfeasible otherwise. Hence, they leave the government with no choice
but to pay higher bonuses to deter bribery. In fact, the feedback scheme may require a bonus
so large that, ultimately, it may not be implementable (without being abused). Specifically, w¯
cannot exceed Gz+s—or, equivalently, G ≤ G¯, for otherwise an official receives so much when
39Recall that, for the sake of brevity, we do not compute the thresholds on damages D that ensure that
the achieved level of social welfare is nonnegative. However, by, for instance, setting λ = 1, one immediately
derives that the region of parameter values such that exploiting feeback is optimal and social welfare positive
is nonempty.
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denying a permit that he finds it profitable to systematically choose r = d and compensate
compliant entrepreneurs for the value of the permit.40 Intuitively, this condition is more easily
satisfied when the cost of abusing the scheme for officials increases: G¯ is increasing in both z
and s.
4.2 Limited ability to pay
In the Supplementary Appendix, we extend our model to incorporate the fact that
entrepreneurs’ ability to pay for permits might not match their willingness to pay. At the
time when they interact with officials, financial resources available to entrepreneurs could be
lower than the value of a permit, for example, due to imperfections on the credit market (e.g.,
Banerjee (1997)). As a consequence, the size of bribes that entrepreneurs can pay may be
smaller than what we considered in Section 3 (i.e., G). We briefly discuss the consequences of
taking in account entrepreneurs’ budget constraints on our main results.
For reasons of space, we only discuss the main results here (we present and solve the
extended model in the Supplementary Appendix). We find that limited ability to pay
increases the desirability of adopting an entrepreneur feedback scheme. Specifically, let the
entrepreneur’s budget be denoted as y. If y < G, the set of parameter values for which
exploiting feedback is optimal is strictly larger than in the baseline model. The intuition is
as follows. As argued in Proposition 2, deterring both forms of corruption is optimal only
if the harm produced by non-compliance is sufficiently large. Otherwise, the government
should tolerate bribery. One reason bribery is less detrimental than extortion is that it hurts
entrepreneurs found noncompliant with regulation—by paying a bribe, they forego some of
the benefits associated with obtaining the permit without complying, thereby inducing some
40To understand the inequality G ≤ G¯, observe that the probability of receiveing wd,0 is the joint probability
of being paired with a noncompliant entrepreneur and observing σ = n. When corruption is deterred, this
probability is (1−H(ρG)) ρ = ψ¯−ρG
ψ¯
ρ (see the commentary to Proposition 2 for the intuiton). Intuitively,
the smaller the probability of receiveing wd,0, the larger wd,0 must be to make the commitment not to deal
with intermediaries rational. Thus, w¯ increases with G. Moreover, because we are restricting attention to
ψ¯+ρs
2ρ < G, the upper bound Gz + s increases with G with a smaller slope than w¯ (except if z is so large that
G¯ exceeds ψ¯).
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to comply with regulation to avoid having to pay a bribe. However, when bribes are limited
at y < G, this disciplining effect of bribes is weakened, and tolerating bribery becomes more
costly.
4.3 Bargaining power of entrepreneurs
We have so far worked under the assumption that officials have full bargaining power when
making deals with entrepreneurs. This assumption is justified by our focus on settings in
which ordinary citizens and small businesses deal with public officials to obtain a government
service. Nevertheless, in the Supplementary Appendix, we generalize our setting to allow
for the bargaining outcome between officials and entrepreneurs to be determined by the
Nash Bargaining solution concept. The main results of our analysis remain unchanged when
entrepreneurs enjoy some bargaining power. In particular, the government is still unable—
if it does not exploit feedback—to deter both extortion and bribery. To deter bribery, the
government must still satisfy inequality (4); that is, the surplus to be shared between an official
and an entrepreneur when σ = n must be highest when r = d. Similarly, to deter extortion,
the government must sill ensure inequality (5) holds; that is, the threat of framing must not
be credible. Both inequalities cannot jointly hold, and the government must again choose
between tolerating either extortion or bribery. Tolerating bribery is still socially optimal,
unless entrepreneurs enjoy high bargaining power. In the latter case, extortion’s detrimental
consequences on the incentives to comply with regulation are low, and avoiding bribery (and
the negative externalities that would ensue) is preferable.
By exploiting feedback, we show the government is able to deter both forms of corruption.
As in the baseline model, implementing the feedback scheme is socially optimal as long as the
damages D are sufficiently high to justify the increased payroll expenses.
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5 Conclusion
One of the most detrimental consequences of petty corruption is that it undermines regulations
aiming to protect society from risks and hazards. We have made the case for a simple
mechanism that exploits entrepreneurs’ complaints and enables the government to deter
corruption. The mechanism does not rely on the government being able to distinguish accurate
from opportunistic complaints, and neither does it require the involvement of costly (and
possibly corrupt) internal or external monitors. We have also shown that, under reasonable
conditions, the presence of intermediaries makes exploiting entrepreneur feedback even more
desirable.
We believe the feedback scheme developed in this paper could be helpful in settings different
from the one we have considered. A first example is tax collection. Tax inspectors—whose
task is to uncover and punish fraud—may be tempted to both collect bribes from violators
and to extort money from compliant tax payers. Such misbehavior clearly has the potential
to distort individuals’ and firms’ incentives to pay taxes (see, e.g., Hindriks et al. (1999)),
and, presumably, the feedback scheme could allow the government to deter corruption and
tax evasion. A similar logic holds for customs duties, which represent an important source of
revenue to governments in many countries, and for which widespread corruption is documented
(Sequeira and Djankov (2013)). In both examples, governments could compensate taxpayers
who cooperate by promising appropriate reductions in the fines.
The enforcement of traffic law provides yet another example. For instance, because
overweight trucks increase the wear and tear of roads and the risk of accidents, trucking firms
are generally required to respect ceilings on truck weight. Weigh stations are set up along the
main commercial routes and, in case of non-compliance, governments mandate the unloading of
excessive cargo and the imposition of fines. However, officials manning these stations are often
corrupt (see, e.g., Olken and Barron (2009) for Indonesia and Foltz and Bromley (2014) for
West Africa). Exactly as in the context of tax compliance, to deter corruption, governments
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could introduce a feedback scheme and promise reduced sanctions to firms or drivers filing
complaints.
Finally, we also believe the mechanism we propose can be applied to tackle collusion and
abuses of authority within firms. Monitoring by supervisors is crucial to ensure employees
have adequate incentives to follow directives. As previous literature has pointed out (see,
e.g., Tirole (1992), Khalil et al. (2010)), collusion with (and harassment of) subordinates
is common in organizations. Although the ultimate objective of the principal might be to
maximize profit rather than social welfare, we believe the mechanism we propose can also help
deter opportunism by supervisors.
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A Appendix: Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
A.1 Preliminaries.
We introduce the following notation. Consider a given entrepreneur-official pair.
• We denote by r′σ (resp. f ′σ) the official’s equilibrium decision (resp. the entrepreneur’s
equilibrium feedback to the government) played in the subgame that follows the
entrepreneur’s rejection of the official’s deal, for a given σ. We refer to this subgame as
the "noncooperative game."
• We denote by r∗σ (resp. f ∗σ and b∗σ ) the official’s equilibrium decision (resp. the
entrepreneur’s equilibrium feedback and the equilibrium bribe) played in the subgame
that follows the entrepreneur’s acceptance of the official’s deal, for a given σ. This is
the solution to problem (1), and we refer to this subgame as the "cooperative game."
• Because payoff functions are additively separable in their arguments, we can write
U (ψ, e, r, f, b) ≡ u(r, f) − ψI(e) − b, where I(h) = 1 and I(l) = 0. We denote
u′σ ≡ u(r′σ, f ′σ) the payoff obtained by the entrepreneur in the noncooperative game,41
and V ′σ ≡ V (σ, r′σ, f ′σ) the corresponding payoff of the official.
The following lemma is useful in limiting the number of cases that need to be considered in
the proofs to come.
Lemma A.1
Any schedule of wages that leads to
(
r
′
c, f
′
c
)
=
(
r
′
n, f
′
n
)
results in a nonpositive level of social
welfare if the activity is allowed.
Proof. Consider (1). Because payoff functions are additively separable in their arguments, we
can write U (ψ, e, r, f, b) ≡ u(r, f) − ψI(e) − b and V (σ, r, f, b) ≡ v(σ, r, f) + b. (1) can be
41Recall that the compliance cost I (e)ψ is sunk at this stage.
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rewritten as
max
{r,f,b}
v(σ, r, f) + b subject to
u(r, f)− ψI(e)− b ≥ u(r′σ, f ′σ)− ψI(e).
Clearly, b∗σ = u(r∗σ, f ∗σ) − u(r′σ, f ′σ), and therefore, U(ψ, e, r∗σ, f ∗σ , b∗σ) = u(r′σ, f ′σ) − ψI(e) for
∀σ, e.
An entrepreneur intent on applying, and with compliance cost ψ, chooses e = h if and only
if
U(ψ, h, r∗c , f
∗
c , b
∗
c) ≥ ρU(ψ, l, r∗n, f ∗n, b∗n) + (1− ρ)U(ψ, l, r∗c , f ∗c , b∗c).
Substituting in U(ψ, e, r∗σ, f ∗σ , b∗σ) = u(r′σ, f ′σ)− ψI(e), the inequality becomes
u(r′c, f
′
c)− ψ ≥ ρu(r′n, f ′n) + (1− ρ)u(r′c, f ′c).
In case
(
r
′
c, f
′
c
)
=
(
r
′
n, f
′
n
)
, the inequality is violated. As a result, no entrepreneur chooses
e = h, and, because D > G by assumption, social welfare is bounded from above by 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Noncooperative Game
We first compute r′σ and u
′
σ for ∀σ. If wd > wg + s, then r′σ = d for ∀σ and, thus, u′σ = 0 for
∀σ. If wg + s ≥ wd ≥ wg − s, then r′c = g and r′n = d. Thus u′c = G and u′n = 0. Finally, if
wg − s > wd, then r′σ = g for ∀σ, and thus u′σ = G for ∀σ.
Cooperative Game
We now compute r∗σ for ∀σ. Given e and σ, any entrepreneur-official pair’s collective payoff is
given by
U(ψ, e, r, f, b) + V (σ, r, f, b) =
wg +G− l (σ, g) s− ψI(e) if r = g,wd − l (σ, d) s− ψI(e) if r = d,
where l (σ, g) (resp. l (σ, d)) is equal to 1 if σ = n (resp. σ = c), and 0 otherwise. Therefore,
if wd > wg + s + G, then r∗σ = d for ∀σ. If wg + s + G ≥ wd ≥ wg − s + G, then r∗c = g and
r∗n = d. Finally, if wg − s+G > wd, then r∗σ = g for ∀σ.
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Officials’ Optimal Schedule of Wages
From Lemma A.1, we know no loss of generality occurs in restricting our attention to schedules
of wages satisfying: wg + s ≥ wd ≥ wg − s. Thus, r′c = g and r′n = d, so that u′c = G and
u
′
n = 0. Moreover, because wg +s ≥ wd and G > 2s, it must be the case that wg−s+G > wd.
Hence, r∗σ = g for ∀σ.
To determine b∗c , the official maximizes wg + bc subject to G − bc ≥ u′c = G, which yields
b∗c = 0. To determine b∗n, the official maximizes wg − s+ bn subject to G− bn ≥ u′n = 0, which
yields b∗n = G.
Therefore, an entrepreneur intent on applying, and with compliance cost ψ, chooses e = h
if and only if G− b∗c −ψ ≥ ρ (G− b∗n) + (1− ρ) (G− b∗c), which simplifies to ρG ≥ ψ. Because
ρ (G− b∗n) + (1− ρ) (G− b∗c) = (1− ρ)G > 0, all entrepreneurs apply for the permit. Also, a
fraction H (ρG) of entrepreneurs chooses e = h, and the rest choose e = l.
The government chooses {wg, wd} to maximize
W =
ˆ ρG
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ) +
ˆ ψ¯
ρG
(G−D) dH (ψ)− (λ− 1)wg subject to (12)
wd ∈ [wg − s, wg + s] .
Setting wg = 0 and wd ∈ [0, s] is optimal. Moreover, expression (12), plugging in wg = 0,
is strictly positive if and only if D < DNF0 ≡ G−
´ ρG
0 ψdH(ψ)
1−H(ρG) . Therefore, when this inequality
holds, setting w∗g = 0 and w∗d ∈ [0, s] is socially optimal. Otherwise, the government cannot
do better than to ban the activity.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Noncooperative Game
We compute r′σ, f
′
σ, and u′σ for ∀σ. Because t > 0, an entrepreneur chooses fσ = 1 ∀σ when
r = d. This leads to three possible outcomes of the noncooperative game. If wg > wd,1 + s,
then r′σ = g and u′σ = G for ∀σ. If wd,1 + s ≥ wg ≥ wd,1 − s, then r′c = g, u′c = G, r′n = d,
f
′
n = 1, and u′n = t. If wd,1 − s > wg, then r′σ = d, f ′σ = 1, and u′σ = t, ∀σ.
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Cooperative Game
We now compute r∗σ and f ∗σ for ∀σ. Any entrepreneur-official pair’s collective payoff is given
by
U(ψ, e, r, f, b) + V (σ, r, f, b) =

wg +G− l (σ, g) s− ψI(e) if r = g,
wd,0 − l (σ, d) s− ψI(e) if r = d and f = 0,
wd,1 + t− l (σ, d) s− ψI(e) if r = d and f = 1,
where l (σ, g) (resp. l (σ, d)) is equal to 1 if σ = n (resp. σ = c), and 0 otherwise. We
disregard the schedules of wages {wg, wd,0, wd,1} that would lead to r∗σ = d for ∀σ. Indeed, the
government can always do better than to systematically deny permits by banning the activity.
This leaves us with three possible outcomes of the cooperative game to consider
• Case i: wg +G > max [wd,0 + s, wd,1 + t+ s], so that r∗σ = g for ∀σ.
• Case ii: wd,0 − s ≤ wg + G ≤ wd,0 + s and wd,0 ≥ wd,1 + t, so that r∗c = c, r∗n = d, and
f ∗n = 0.
• Case iii: wd,1− s+ t ≤ wg +G ≤ wd,1 + s+ t and wd,1 + t ≥ wd,0, so that r∗c = g, r∗n = d,
and f ∗n = 1.
Officials’ Optimal Schedule of Wages
From Lemma A.1, we know no loss of generality occurs in restricting our attention to
schedules of wages satisfying: wd,1 + s ≥ wg ≥ wd,1 − s. Thus, r′c = g, r′n = d, and f ′n = 1.
Also, u′c = G and u
′
n = t.
For each case, if relevant, we characterize the associated expression for the social welfare
function, and the (locally) optimal schedule of wages. We then compare welfare levels to
determine the globally optimal schedule of wages {wg, wd,0, wd,1}.
Case i
Here, r∗σ = g for ∀σ. To determine b∗c , the official maximizes wg + bc subject to
G − bc ≥ u′c = G, which yields b∗c = 0 for ∀σ. To determine b∗n, the official maximizes
wg − s + bn subject to G − bn ≥ u′n = t, which yields b∗n = G − t for ∀σ. As a result, an
entrepreneur intent on applying, with compliance cost ψ, chooses e = h if and only if
G− b∗c − ψ ≥ ρ (G− b∗n) + (1− ρ) (G− b∗c) ,
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which simplifies to ψ ≤ ρ (G− t). Because ρt+ (1− ρ)G > 0, all entrepreneurs apply for the
permit. A fraction H (ρ (G− t)) of them chooses e = h, and the rest choose e = l.
The government chooses {wg, wd,0, wd,1, t} to maximize
W =
ˆ ρ(G−t)
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ) + (1−H (ρ (G− t))) (G−D − ρs)− (λ− 1)wg s. t. (13)
wg ∈ [wd,1 − s, wd,1 + s]), (14)
wd,1 + (t+ s) < wg +G, (15)
wd,0 + s < wg +G. (16)
Setting wg = 0, wd,0 ∈ [0, G − s), and wd,1 ∈ [0, s] is optimal because it achieves the highest
possible value of (13) while satisfying all constraints. Observe also that (13) is decreasing in t,
so that setting t arbitrarily close to 0 is optimal. Social welfare is then made arbitrarily close
to
W =
ˆ ρG
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ) +
ˆ ψ¯
ρG
(G−D − ρs) dH (ψ) . (17)
Case ii
Here, r∗c = g, r∗n = d, and f ∗n = 0. To determine b∗c , the official maximizes wg + bc subject
to G − bc ≥ u′c = G, which yields b∗c = 0. To determine b∗n, the official maximizes wd,0 + bn
subject to 0− bn ≥ u′n = t, which yields b∗n = −t.
An entrepreneur intent on applying, with compliance cost ψ, chooses e = h if and only if
G− b∗c − ψ ≥ ρ (0− b∗n) + (1− ρ) (G− b∗c) ,
which simplifies to ψ ≤ ρ (G− t). Because ρt+ (1− ρ)G > 0, all entrepreneurs apply for the
permit. A fraction H (ρ (G− t)) of them chooses e = h, and the rest choose e = l.
The government chooses {wg, wd,0, wd,1, t} to maximize
W =
ˆ ρ(G−t)
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ) + (1− ρ)
ˆ ψ¯
ρ(G−t)
(G−D) dH (ψ) (18)
− [1− ρ (1−H (ρ (G− t)))] (λ− 1)wg − (1−H (ρ (G− t))) ρ (λ− 1)wd,0 s.t.
wg +G ∈ [wd,0 − s, wd,0 + s], (19)
wd,0 ≥ wd,1 + t, (20)
wg ∈ [wd,1 − s, wd,1 + s]. (21)
Notice objective function (18) is decreasing in wg and wd,0. Also, from (19) and (20), wd,0
is bounded from below by wd,1 + t and wg +G− s. Suppose only constraint wd,0 ≥ wg +G− s
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binds. Substituting wd,0 = wg +G− s into (18), one immediately derives that setting wg = 0
and t arbitrarily close to 0 is optimal. Moreover, setting wd,1 ∈ [0, s] ensures that the other
constraints are indeed satisfied. Social welfare is then equal to
W =
ˆ ρG
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ) + (1− ρ)
ˆ ψ¯
ρG
(G−D) dH (ψ) (22)
− (1−H (ρG)) ρ (λ− 1) (G− s) .
Observe that (22) is positive if and only if
D ≤ DF0 ≡
1
1− ρ
(
D¯ − λρ (G− s)
)
.
Case iii
Here, r∗c = g, r∗n = d, and f ∗n = 1. To determine b∗c , the official maximizes wg + bc subject
to G − bc ≥ u′c = G, which yields b∗c = 0. To determine b∗n, the official maximizes wd,1 + bn
subject to t− bn ≥ u′n = t, which yields b∗n = 0.
An entrepreneur intent on applying, and with compliance cost ψ, chooses e = h if and only
if
G− b∗c − ψ ≥ ρ (t− b∗n) + (1− ρ) (G− b∗c) ,
which simplifies to ψ ≤ ρ (G− t). Because ρt + (1− ρ)G > 0, all entrepreneurs apply. A
fraction H (ρ (G− t)) of them chooses e = h, and the rest choose e = l.
The government chooses {wg, wd,0, wd,1, t} to maximize
W =
ˆ ρ(G−t)
0
(G− ψ − (λ− 1)wg) dH (ψ) (23)
+ (1−H (ρ (G− t))) (1− ρ) (G−D − (λ− 1)wg)
− (1−H (ρ (G− t))) ρ (λ− 1) (wd,1 + t) ,
subject to the conditions on wg, wd,0, and wd,1 that define Case iii.
Because the inequality wd,1 + t ≥ wg +G− s must hold, for expression (23) to be equal to
(22), it must necessarily be the case that wg = 0, wd,1 = G− s, and t be set arbitrarily close
to 0. Any other combination of wg, wd,1, and t satisfying the inequality wd,1 + t ≥ wg +G− s
leads to (23) being strictly lower than (22). Moreover, setting wg = 0, wd,1 = G − s, and t
arbitrarily close to 0 violates the condition whereby wg ≥ wd,1−s. We can therefore infer that
the highest possible level of welfare in Case iii is lower than that achieved in Case ii. We can
safely disregard schedules of wages that satisfy the conditions of Case iii.
48
Socially optimal scheme
The last step involves comparing welfare levels. Only two wage schedules are relevant: those
associated with Case i and Case ii. Welfare level (22) is strictly higher than (17) if and only if
D > DF ≡ λ (G− s). It is thus necessary for this condition to hold for the feedback scheme
to be optimal. Further, welfare level (22) is nonnegative if and only if D ≤ DF0 . Thus, it is
also necessary that this condition holds for the implementation of the feedback scheme to be
preferred over banning the activity. Finally, DF0 ≥ DF if and only if λ ≤ D
NF
0
G−s . Thus, it is
optimal to exploit feedback whenever λ ≤ DNF0
G−s and D
F < D ≤ DF0 . If λ ≤ D
NF
0
G−s and D ≤ DF ,
the wage schedule associated to Case i is optimal: the government does not exploit feedback
but allows the activity.
Finally, if λ > D
NF
0
G−s and D ≤ DNF0 , the optimal incentive scheme is again the wage schedule
associated to Case i. If λ > D
NF
0
G−s and D > D
NF
0 , the government should ban the activity.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
In Section 4.1, we argued that tolerating bribery so as to deter extortion was optimal.
Recall also that we anticipate, without loss of generality, that all entrepreneurs apply for the
permit. Because bc = 0, bn = G, and r = g for ∀σ, an entrepreneur chooses e = h if and only
if
G− ψ ≥
(1− ρ)G if p > ρG,G− p if ρG ≥ p. (24)
In (24), the right-hand side is the maximum between the expected payoff an entrepreneur
enjoys when e = l and that when e = i. Given that extortion is ruled out, an entrepreneur
who complies with regulation obtains the permit with probability 1. Those who do not comply
either directly bribe officials (when detected) or acquire the permit through an intermediary.
In the former case, the cost of obtaining the permit is the expected bribe ρG. In the latter,
it is p. Hence, when p > ρG, all entrepreneurs who do not comply with regulation prefer
to deal directly with officials. When ρG ≥ p, they all prefer to deal with intermediaries.
Hence, ψ˜ = min (ρG, p). As one would expect, the fraction of entrepreneurs who comply with
regulation is nondecreasing in p.
Consider now the ex ante payoff of a given official. This payoff can be written as
wg +
(1−H(ρG)) · ρ (G− s) if p > ρG,(1−H(p)) · (p− ρs) if ρG ≥ p. (25)
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When p > ρG, the entrepreneur with whom the official is paired does not use an intermediary.
Therefore, the official anticipates that the probability of dealing with a noncompliant
entrepreneur is 1−H(ρG), and that the expected bribe from such an entrepreneur (net of the
lying cost s) is ρ (G− s). When ρG ≥ p, the official knows the entrepreneur with whom he
is paired uses an intermediary if noncompliant (i.e., all entrepreneurs for which ψ ≤ p choose
e = h). Hence, the probability of dealing with an intermediary is 1−H(p), and the payoff is
equal to p−ρs. Finally, because bribery is tolerated, the official always grants the permit and
pockets wg.
We maximize (25) with respect to p. The objective function is ψ¯−ρG
ψ¯
·ρ (G− s) for ∀p > ρG.
If p ≤ ρG, the objective function is (1−H(p)) · (p− ρs) =
(
1− p
ψ¯
)
(p− ρs). Because
H(p) = p
ψ¯
, the locally optimal p is equal to min
[
ρG, ψ¯+ρs
2
]
, which leads to an ex ante payoff
equal to max
[
ψ¯−ρG
ψ¯
· ρ (G− s) , ψ¯2−(ρs)2
4ψ¯
]
. The globally optimal p is equal to min
[
ρG, ψ¯+ρs
2
]
.42
Using (24), it follows that a fraction min
[
H( ψ¯+ρs
2
), H(ρG)
]
of entrepreneurs chooses e = h,
whereas the remainder choose e = i.
A.5 Proof of the Corollary to Proposition 3
Following Proposition 3, when G > ψ¯+ρs
2ρ
, welfare is equal to
W =
ˆ ψ¯+ρs
2
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ)−
ˆ ψ¯
ψ¯+ρs
2
(D −G+ ρs) dH (ψ)− (λ− 1)wg.
Because (5) must hold, setting wg = 0 and wd ∈ [0, s] is optimal. Hence,
W =
ˆ ψ¯+ρs
2
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ)−
ˆ ψ¯
ψ¯+ρs
2
(D −G+ ρs) dH (ψ) . (26)
Assume now G ≤ ψ¯+ρs
2ρ
. From Proposition 3, we have
W =
ˆ ρG
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ)−
ˆ ψ¯
ρG
(D −G+ ρs) dH (ψ)− (λ− 1)wg.
Again, setting wg = 0 and wd ∈ [0, s] is optimal. Hence,
W =
ˆ ρG
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ)−
ˆ ψ¯
ρG
(D −G+ ρs) dH (ψ) . (27)
42The official’s ex ante payoff is constant for any p ≥ ρG, we assume that, when indifferent between several
values of p, the official chooses the smallest.
50
Finally, assume that the government bans intermediaries. The action space is restricted to
e = {l, h}. Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1, one obtains that
W =
ˆ ρG
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ)−
ˆ ψ¯
ρG
(D −G+ ρs) dH (ψ) . (28)
We can now compare social welfare in the presence and in the absence of intermediaries. When
G > ψ¯+ρs
2ρ
, (26) is strictly smaller than (28). When G ≤ ψ¯+ρs
2ρ
, (28) and (27) are identical.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
We first characterize the outcome of the noncooperative and cooperative games played by a
given entrepreneur-official pair. We then compute the optimal price an intermediary charges,
and end with a welfare analysis. Recall also that we assume wd,0 ≥ G − s > wd,1 = wg = 0
and t =  > 0 and arbitrarily small.
Direct interaction between official and entrepreneur (e = h, l).
Consider the noncooperative game played by a given entrepreneur-official pair. Because
t > 0, f = 1 when r = d. Thus, when σ = c, the official’s payoff is equal to 0 if r = g and
equal to −s otherwise. When σ = n, the official’s payoff is equal to −s when r = g, and equal
to 0 otherwise. It follows that (i) r′c = g and u′c = G and (ii) r′n = d and u′n = t.
Consider now the cooperative game. Because u′c = G, the official proposes b∗c = 0 and
r∗c = g if wd,0 ≤ Gz + s, and b∗c = −G, r∗c = d, and f ∗c = 0 otherwise. Hence, when σ = c,
the entrepreneur (official) obtains G (0) if wd,0 ≤ Gz + s, and G (wd,0 − Gz − s) otherwise.
Suppose now σ = n. The official chooses b∗n = − and r∗n = d, and f ∗n = 0. Hence, when
σ = n, the entrepreneur (official) obtains  (wd0 − ). Recall that  is arbitrarily small.
Given that setting wd,0 > Gz+s entails r∗σ = d for ∀σ, we disregard incentive schemes such
that this condition holds: permits would be systematically denied and social welfare would be
bounded from above by 0.
Interaction with intermediary (e = i).
When interacting with an intermediary, an official grants the permit in exchange for p.
The entrepreneur (official) obtains G− p (p− ρs).
Price setting by the official.
An entrepreneur with cost of compliance ψ chooses e = h if and only if
G− b∗c − ψ ≥ max [(1− ρ) (G− b∗c) + ρb∗n, G− p, 0] ,
which simplifies to G−ψ ≥ max [(1− ρ)G,G− p] .Making use of this constraint, and recalling
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that wg = 0, an official’s ex ante payoff is equal to(1−H(p)) · (p− ρs) if ρG ≥ p(1−H(ρG)) · ρwd,0 if p > ρG.
Maximizing the above with respect to p yields the following. If p ≤ ρG, the official’s payoff
is (1−H(p)) · (p− ρs) =
(
1− p
ψ¯
)
(p− ρs). Because H(p) = p
ψ¯
, the locally optimal p is
min
[
ρG, ψ¯+ρs
2
]
, which entails an ex ante payoff of max
[
ψ¯−ρG
ψ¯
· ρ (G− s) , ψ¯2−(ρs)2
4ψ¯
]
. The payoff
is
(
ψ¯−ρG
ψ¯
)
· ρwd,0, for ∀p > ρG. As mentioned in the statement of Proposition 4, we restrict
attention to the case G > ψ¯+ρs
2ρ
. Hence, the official sets p = ψ¯+ρs
2
if wd,0 < w¯ ≡ ψ¯2−(ρs)
2
4ρ(ψ¯−ρG) , and
ρG < p otherwise.
Because wd,0 ≤ Gz + s must hold, for wd,0 ≥ w¯ to be feasible it must be that w¯ ≤ Gz + s.
Solving this last inequality with respect to G, we obtain that it holds if and only if G ≤ G ≤ G¯,
where
G ≡
(
ψ¯ − ρs/z)−√(ψ¯ − ρs/z)2 − 1
z
((
ψ¯ − ρs)2 − 4ρsψ¯)
2ρ
,
G¯ ≡
(
ψ¯ − ρs/z)+√(ψ¯ − ρs/z)2 − 1
z
((
ψ¯ − ρs)2 − 4ρsψ¯)
2ρ
.
Recalling that z ≥ 1, we can show that G < ψ¯+ρs
2ρ
< G¯. To see this, consider that, when z = 1,
G¯ =
(
ψ¯ − ρs)+ 2√ρsψ¯
2ρ
>
ψ¯ + ρs
2ρ
,
which follows from the fact that ψ¯ > ρs. Furthermore, it is easily seen that ∂G¯
∂z
> 0. Finally,
we have G < ψ¯−ρs/z
2ρ
< ψ¯+ρs
2ρ
, for any z. Since G > ψ¯+ρs
2ρ
by assumption, we have established
that G ≤ G¯ is necessary for wd,0 ≥ w¯ to be feasible.
Behavior of entrepreneurs and social welfare.
If wd,0 < w¯, so that p = ψ¯+ρs2 , a fraction H(
ψ¯+ρs
2
) of entrepreneurs choose e = h, whereas
the remainder choose e = i. If wd,0 ≥ w¯, so that ρG < p, a fraction H(ρG) of entrepreneurs
choose e = h, whereas the remainder choose e = l and obtain a permit only if σ = c; that is,
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with probability 1− ρ. Thus, conditionally on wd,0 < w¯, social welfare is equal to
W =
ˆ ψ¯+ρs
2
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ)−
ˆ ψ¯
ψ¯+ρs
2
(D −G+ ρs) dH (ψ) . (29)
Assume now wd,0 ≥ w¯. Social welfare is equal to
W =
ˆ ρG
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ)− (1− ρ)
ˆ ψ¯
ρG
(D −G) dH (ψ)− (λ− 1) ρ (1−H(ρG))wd,0.
it is clearly optimal to set wd,0 = w¯. Hence,
W =
ˆ ρG
0
(G− ψ) dH (ψ)− (1− ρ)
ˆ ψ¯
ρG
(D −G) dH (ψ)− (λ− 1) ρ (1−H(ρG)) w¯. (30)
As shown above, wd,0 = w¯ is feasible if and only if G ≤ G¯. Assume this condition holds.
Comparing (29) and (30), we can conclude that there exists a threshold DI such that (29) is
smaller than (30) if and only if D > DI .
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